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This paper investigates the motive of geographic risk diversification in the loan activity for 
bank mergers in the EU on a sample of large banking groups. Geographic diversification 
should allow banks to reduce their risk. We observe that the loan portfolios of European 
banks are home-biased. We apply the portfolio approach to explore the risk-return efficiency 
of the locations of banks’ activities. We also study mergers between pairs of banks. We 
provide evidence on the sub-optimality of the loan portfolios of European banks in terms of 
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Since the beginning of the 1990s, an increasing wave of mergers is observable in 
European banking. A prime aim of research on bank mergers has therefore been to identify 
motives for bank mergers in the European Union. These motives, such as economies of scale 
or scope (Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996) and managerial efficiency (Vander Vennet, 1996), 
have already been studied in European bank mergers. The risk diversification motive, which 
can be summarized by the adage “don’t put all your eggs in one basket”, has however been 
given less attention. This may in fact justify two different strategies: on the one hand, the 
diversification of activities between sectors of activity, for instance by creating a financial 
conglomerate including banking and insurance activities; on the other hand, geographic 
diversification. This strategy is based upon the fact that a company that operates in several 
countries can substantially limit its exposure to economic shocks and thereby reduce the risk 
associated with its activity. 
The case of geographic diversification is especially relevant in banking, as bank 
performance is directly connected with economic activity. This relationship has been 
empirically illustrated in the literature. Clark and Wheelock (1997) for instance find that U.S. 
banks’ earnings are strongly influenced by the economic growth of the states where they are 
located. Huh and Kim (1994) moreover observe that the bad loan rate is anticyclical in Japan 
and Korea. This also makes sense on a practical ground, as the 5
th C of the 5Cs of 
creditworthiness used by bank credit analysts is “conditions”, defined as economic conditions 
that affect the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. 
Consequently, as a bank’s lending environment is heavily influenced by economic 
activity within the bank’s operating environment, there is scope for risk reduction through 
geographic diversification of lending activities. Indeed, as Berger (2000) points out, banks 
may diversify risks because the returns of loans issued in different countries may have 
relatively low covariation. This is precisely this aspect of bank mergers that we investigate in 
  2this paper. Indeed our aim here is to evaluate the importance of the motive of geographic 
diversification of risk in the loan activity for European bank mergers. 
The basic idea of our methodology is based on a representation of banks’ lending 
environment that is obtained by forming country portfolios for European banking 
organizations based on the extent of their presence in different states. In the spirit of Gunther 
and Robinson (1999), we therefore use the portfolio approach to evaluate the relevance of the 
geographic diversification motive in European bank mergers. 
These authors analyze the risk of US banks’ loan portfolios by considering the mix of 
economic activities of the states in which they operate. They resort to the analogy between 
financial assets and industries in a portfolio analysis where the growth rate of an industry and 
the variance of its growth rate are the analogues to expected return and risk in financial 
portfolios. Each state is then considered as a collection of industries, and banks consequently 
build up industry portfolios by operating in different states. A bank’s risk diversification is 
subsequently measured by the coefficient of variation of its industry portfolio. Gunther and 
Robinson demonstrate that this measure of risk diversification is positively correlated with the 
probability of bank failure, proving thereby the relevance of their approach. 
However our methodology differs from Gunther and Robinson’s in two important 
respects. Firstly, unlike these authors, we directly consider that countries are the basic assets 
of a bank’s loan portfolio. By operating in a country, a banking group takes a participation in 
an asset that is described by its growth rate and the variance of its growth rate. This 
specification seems more appealing because in the first place it is simpler. Indeed as the 
evolution of a GDP results from the addition of the evolution of all industries in a country, 
measuring diversification directly at the country level avoids unnecessary computations. 
More to the point, as Gunther and Robinson compute industry performance at the 
federal level, they blur the effects of regional economic policies. Contrarywise, our 
methodology allows us to take into account the differences in national policies across EU 
members. The same method can be found in Goldberg and Levi (2000), who apply the 
portfolio approach to a set of countries considered as financial assets. However their aim is 
radically different, as they explore the potential diversification benefits of the European 
Union. 
Secondly, we measure risk diversification by estimating a risk-return efficiency 
frontier, allowing to compare the effective risk to the optimal risk for a given level of return. 
This approach has two advantages over the coefficient of variation used by Gunther and 
Robinson. On one hand, it provides a benchmark measure. On the other hand, it takes into 
  3consideration the concavity of the risk-return efficiency frontier. Indeed, the drawback of 
Gunther and Robinson’s risk diversification measure is that it does not allow to discriminate 
between a portfolio that is located on the efficient frontier and another portfolio with half as 
much risk and return, although the latter is unambiguously farther from the frontier than the 
former hence less efficient. 
In this aim, we use macroeconomic data for all EU countries for the period 1960-1995 
and accounting data for the 52 biggest European banking groups and their subsidiaries. This 
application of the portfolio approach to European banking raises four fundamental questions. 
Q1: Could European banks have diversified their macroeconomic risk? 
More precisely, we aim to know if business cycles are correlated across European 
countries. Indeed a perfect correlation between countries would result in the absence of 
opportunities for risk diversification. We then observe that such opportunities exist. 
Q2: Have European banks diversified their macroeconomic risk? 
Provided diversification opportunities exist, the point is to know whether European 
banks have taken advantage of these opportunities during our period of study. We observe 
that loan portfolios are clearly home-biased and conclude that European banks did not exploit 
these opportunities. However this observation does not mean that banks made inefficient 
decisions about the location of their activities in terms of risk-return management. 
Q3: Were European banks risk-return efficient? 
Using the portfolio approach, we show that the actual locations of the activities of 
European banks were not optimal, insofar as those groups could have benefited from a lower 
risk for the same expected return of their loan portfolio. Finally, as diversification is typically 
envisaged through mergers of pairs of banks, we come to the following question. 
Q4: Could have mergers improved banks’ risk-return efficiency? 
We show that in general inter-country pairwise mergers of banks would have 
improved the risk-return efficiency of the banks involved. 
The paper is organized so as to answer each question in turn. Namely, section 2 
answers questions Q1 and Q2, while sections 3 and 4 respectively address questions Q3 and 
Q4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
  42. Could European banks have diversified their macroeconomic 
risk? Have they? 
 
In this section, we describe the data used in this study. In so doing, we ascertain that 
business cycles are not perfectly correlated across Europe and that there therefore exist 
opportunities for risk diversification. We subsequently observe a striking home bias in the 
activities of banking groups. 
 
2.1. Correlation analysis of business cycles 
 
To study the co-movements of business cycles across countries we compute the 
correlation of annual real GDP growth rates across the fifteen member countries of the 
European Union. Our data stem from the OECD Economic Outlook database. They cover the 
1960-1995 period. 
More specifically, we compute the contemporaneous correlation of GDP growth for 
each pair of countries. If business cycles are perfectly correlated between two countries, the 
coefficient of correlation of their GDP growth rates is equal to one and there does not exist 
any possibility of diversification. Therefore, the lower the coefficient of correlation, the 
greater the opportunities of diversification will be. Table 1 below displays our results. 
 
Table 1: Coefficients of correlation between growth rates 
  AT BE DE DK ES  FI  FR GB GR IE  IT  LU NL PT 
AT  1.000               
BE  0.708  1.000              
DE  0.672  0.739  1.000             
DK  0.444  0.523  0.674  1.000            
ES  0.592  0.727  0.572  0.417  1.000          
FI  0.418  0.529  0.415  0.361  0.470 1.000         
FR  0.747  0.865  0.754  0.579  0.815 0.538 1.000        
GB  0.236  0.318  0.416  0.486  0.320 0.473 0.413 1.000       
GR  0.517 0.562 0.619 0.511 0.572 0.428 0.654 0.400 1.000      
IE  -0.056 0.027 -0.007 -0.088 0.036 0.113 0.000 0.088 0.047 1.000        
IT  0.595 0.748 0.579 0.425 0.708 0.452 0.783 0.321 0.478 -0.016  1.000      
LU  0.275  0.363 0.432 0.298 0.219 0.193 0.240 0.413 0.107 0.041 0.145 1.000    
NL  0.549 0.726 0.702 0.549 0.478 0.240 0.711 0.318 0.392 0.082  0.511 0.325 1.000  
PT  0.640 0.676 0.561 0.336 0.560 0.327 0.713 0.429 0.462 -0.012  0.654  0.166  0.544 1.000
SE  0.425 0.669 0.521 0.476 0.594 0.734 0.649 0.444 0.512 0.048  0.591  0.074  0.516 0.330
AT Austria, BE Belgium, DE Germany, DK Denmark, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, 
GR Greece, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LU Luxembourg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, SE Sweden. 
Significant coefficients at the 10% level are in bold. 
 
 
  5A quick glance at table 1 shows that most coefficients of correlation are significant at 
the ten percent level of confidence. On the other side all significant coefficients of correlation 
are positive. This means that no country has a business cycle negatively correlated with 
another country’s. However, all significant coefficients of correlation are noticeably smaller 
than one for all pairs of countries. In other words, business cycles were not perfectly 
correlated across Europe over our period of study.
1 Our study confirms the results of the 
literature devoted to the assessment of the convergence of business cycles across European 
countries. (see e.g. Cohen and Wyplosz, 1989, or Weber, 1991, and, for a survey, Frankel and 
Rose, 1998). 
The preliminary conclusion that we can therefore draw from table 1 is that, as business 
cycles differ across Europe, the geographic diversification of a banking group’s activities 
would have resulted in the diversification of its macroeconomic risk.
2 The question that 
consequently arises is whether banking groups have taken those risk diversification 
possibilities into account in their decisions to develop cross-border activities. The following 
subsection provides a tentative answer. 
 
2.2. Geographic diversification of bank loans 
 
The second question of our analysis is to know whether European banks hold 
diversified loan portfolios. Our analysis concentrates on large banking groups - defined as 
groups whose consolidated assets are greater than 50 billion US dollars in 1997 - from EU 
countries. We decide to focus on large banking groups because their activities are on average 
more diversified between industries than those of other banks. Consequently, the use of these 
groups is consistent with the key assumption of our methodology according to which the 
return of a bank’s loan portfolio in one country is measured by the growth rate of this country. 
We also choose to concentrate on loans as a measure of bank operations. The reason is 
again our key assumption to approximate the return of a bank’s loan portfolio in one country 
by the growth rate of that country. Indeed it makes sense to believe that the return and the risk 
of a portfolio of loans granted in a country are directly correlated with that country’s growth 
rate: the better the economic situation, the lower the volume of non-performing loans. 
Our analysis of the risk of loan portfolios for large European banking groups requires 
the aggregation of the loan portfolios of all the components of each group. We choose to 
adopt a control criterion to define the banks taken into account as components of a banking 
group.
3 We assume that each bank controlled by a banking group for at least 30% is part of 
  6the banking group for our computation of the loan portfolios. Furthermore, we focus on banks 
in which banking groups’ participations are as follows. When the parent company of the 
group is not a holding bank, we only take into account the participations directly for at least 
30% of the banking group. When the parent company is a holding bank, we add another level 
of aggregation to include both direct participations from the holding bank and from the main 
banks of the group.
4 We include the whole volume of loans of each bank taken into account in 
the loan portfolios of banking groups. 
These choices are motivated by the problems that arise when consolidating banking 
groups. If we had not limited the level of control, the complexity of this procedure would 
have increased to a great extent because of never-ending indirect participations, and, on the 
other hand, of the crossed participations of some major banks that would result from the 
complex pattern of banking groups’ ownership. 
Information on bank ownership and individual bank loans in 1997 is extracted from 
the "Bankscope" database of IBCA. Our sample includes 52 banking groups
5 that are listed in 
annex. Breakdown of the sample of banking groups by nationality shows 14 German, 9 
French, 9 British, 7 Italian, 4 Dutch, 2 Spanish, 2 Swedish, 2 Belgian, 1 Austrian, 1 Danish, 
and 1 Finnish. We can thus observe that the four most populated EU countries clearly 
dominate our sample. 
A remark has here to be made about nationality: the nationality of each banking group 
has to be known to define whether a participation is domestic or not. In this aim, our general 
rule is to consider the nationality of the parent company of the group, following the criteria of 
IBCA: the legal location of the parent company. However, two banking groups, Dexia and 
Fortis, do not have such a well-specified nationality as they were established as a partnership 
between two banks with different nationalities. We then consider these banks as follows: 
when computing diversification indices, we include loans from both their home countries as 
domestic loans. However, when presenting loans by country, we consider the Fortis group as 
a Belgian group and the Dexia Group as a French group. The criterion for this choice – that 
only influences the presentation of the results and not the results themselves – is the country 
where the group has the biggest volume of loans. 
We compute two indices of diversification based on bank loans data. Firstly, we 
measure the relative share of loans of the banking group in the home country of the group 
(“Home Share”). This basic indicator informs us directly on the loan activities of the group 
abroad. Secondly, we compute the Herfindahl indices for all banking groups. The Herfindahl 
index is calculated as the sum of the squared relative shares of loans in each country for every 
  7banking group. It takes into account the relative size and distribution of the relative shares in a 
portfolio and approaches zero when the loan portfolio consists of a large number of relative 
shares of loans by country of relatively equal size. Consequently, in comparison with the 
“Home Share” index, the Herfindahl index provides information about the dispersion and size 
of loan shares abroad. 
Table 2 displays both indices of diversification alongside with the main statistics and 
gathers banking groups by country.
6 The main result of the table is the weak diversification of 
loan portfolios of large European banking groups across European countries. Banking groups 
own on average almost 93% of their loans in their home country. Individual diversification 
indices corroborate this diagnosis, as only 10 banking groups hold less than 90% of their 
loans in their home country. Mean Herfindahl index of 88.56% for the whole sample confirms 
this result, as it shows that loans abroad are not dispersed between numerous countries.
7
Analysis by country suggests a higher diversification of loan portfolios for banks 
originating from small countries. Indeed Belgian, Dutch and Finnish banking groups have 
mean Herfindahl indices that are clearly lower than 80%. However this is not verified in all 
cases, as Spanish banking groups are more diversified than Danish or Swedish ones. 
The main conclusion of this subsection is that large European banking groups have not 
diversified their loan portfolios on a geographic basis. They hold a dominant share of their 
loans in their home country. Cross-border mergers were still very limited in European 
banking in 1997, date of our study. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) confirmed this result in 
their study of large listed bank merger deals that happened in Europe between 1988 and 1997. 
They found that more than 80% of analyzed bank-to-bank deals were domestic. 
We reached two major conclusions in this section. Firstly, business cycles are not 
perfectly correlated between EU member countries. As a consequence, there exist 
opportunities for risk diversification of European banks. The answer to question Q1 is then 
clearly positive. However we observe that major European banking groups do not hold 
diversified loan portfolios across European countries. It therefore seems that they have not 
taken advantage of the opportunities for risk diversification that exist in Europe. We 
consequently provide a negative answer to question Q2. The next section aims at assessing the 
optimality of the choices of European banking groups. 
 
  8Table 2: Indices of diversification 
Country 
 
N Index  Mean  Std 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Austria  1 Home  Share  99.70  .  99.70  99.70 
   Herfindahl  99.40  .  99.40  99.40 
Belgium  2  Home  Share  94.97 4.75 91.61  98.33 
   Herfindahl  71.14  18.48  58.07  84.20 
Denmark  1 Home  Share  96.52  .  96.52  96.52 
   Herfindahl  93.28  .  93.28  93.28 
Finland  1 Home  Share  74.66  .  74.66  74.66 
   Herfindahl  62.14  .  62.14  62.14 
France  9  Home  Share  96.61 8.57 73.81 100 
   Herfindahl  91.27  22.96  30.12  100 
Germany  14 Home  Share  90.25  16.28  36.64  100 
   Herfindahl  85.68  17.59  33.61  100 
Italy  7  Home  Share  98.01 2.63 94.00 100 
    Herfindahl  96.18 5.00 88.55 100 
Netherlands  4 Home  Share  80.09  23.53  54.05  100 
   Herfindahl  71.91  32.83  37.64  100 
Spain  2 Home  Share  72.34  35.57  47.18  97.49 
   Herfindahl  72.18  32.39  49.28  95.09 
Sweden  2  Home  Share  98.33 1.18 97.50  99.17 
    Herfindahl  96.74 2.27 95.13  98.34 
United Kingdom  9  Home  Share  99.31 1.37 95.97 100 
    Herfindahl  98.67 2.63 92.26 100 
Total 52  Home  Share 92.99  13.85  36.64 100 
   Herfindahl  88.56  18.69  30.12  100 
All figures are in percentage. N: number of observations in each country. 
 
 
3. Were European banks risk-return efficient? 
 
The simple observation that banking groups have not diversified their activities across 
countries does not allow us to conclude that they made inefficient decisions. For instance, a 
banking group may well have chosen to concentrate its activities in a single country whose 
growth rate variability is high but is compensated by a high expected growth rate, which 
cannot be deemed inefficient a priori. We therefore need a benchmark to assess the efficiency 
of banking groups’ loans portfolios. 
In this section, we apply the portfolio approach to judge whether the actual location of 
the activities of the banking groups under study provided a risk-return efficient portfolio. The 
first sub-section therefore describes how we adapt the portfolio methodology to study the 
geographic diversification of banking activities. The second sub-section displays our results. 
 
  93.1. Methodology 
 
As our paper rests on the application of the portfolio method, we must describe the 
assets of which the portfolios we study consist and determine the weight of each asset in those 
portfolios. Accordingly, and following Goldberg and Levi (2000), we suppose that European 
countries are the basic assets that make up a portfolio. Furthermore, each country is described 
by its average annual growth rate, which is the analogue to the expected return of a financial 
return, and the variability of its annual growth rate, which is the equivalent of the risk 
associated with a financial asset. 
Secondly, we suppose that the weight of a country in the portfolio of a banking group 
is given by the share of the banking group’s total loans in that country. The basic rationale for 
that assumption is that loans are, among all bank activities, the one that is most correlated 
with the level of macroeconomic activity, because of the relationship between the business 
cycle and the bad loan rate (see e.g. Huh and Kim, 1994). Finally, as we only focus on large 
banks, their activities are not restricted to a particular industry and consequently depend on 
the general macroeconomic context of the country where they take place. 







i country in j bank by granted loans
i country in j bank by granted loans
α       (1) 
A similar method was adapted by Gunther and Robinson (1999) who considered 
portfolios of industries instead of portfolios of countries to study the risk exposure of 
American banking groups. 
Once each country’s risk and return have been defined, the overall return of a banking 
group’s portfolio is readily obtained by weighting each country’s growth rate by the relative 
importance of that country in the portfolio of the banking group. Accordingly, group j’s 
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where gi is country i’s average annual growth rate. 
Similarly, the standard deviation of the return of a group’s portfolio is obtained thanks 
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In the above expression, ωi, k denotes the covariance of country i’s growth rate with 
country k’s. However, whenever i = k, ωi, k simply denotes the variance of country i’s growth 
rate. 
With these definitions in mind, the application of the portfolio method is 
straightforward. The final step of our analysis is to assess the risk-return efficiency of a 
bank’s portfolio. We therefore determine each bank’s efficient portfolio, which is defined as 
the combination of loans that would produce the same return as the bank’s actual portfolio but 
with a least return variability. We accordingly determine the optimal standard deviation of a 
group j’s portfolio, which we denote stdoj.
8
Finally, we measure the risk-return efficiency of a loan portfolio by computing an 





score =           ( 4 )  
In other words, a bank j’s score is the ratio of the minimum risk it could have taken 
had its loan portfolio been efficient to the risk it has in fact taken. A bank’s score is by 
construction positive and smaller than one. A score equal to one denotes a perfectly efficient 
portfolio. On the other hand, a bank’s score that is close to zero means that that bank could 





Table 3 summarizes our results by country. The number of banking groups that were 
included in our sample in each country is displayed.
9 Scores are averaged by country. 
Whenever relevant, the minimum and maximum scores are provided, as well as the standard 
deviation of the scores in each country. 
A first glance at table 3 reveals that scores are quite low, meaning that sizeable 
reductions in risk could be obtained
1. Their overall average amounts to 58.05%. However 
significant discrepancies are observable. Broadly speaking, average risk-return efficiency 
scores range from 42.33% for the Finish bank to 62.02% for the Austrian one. In the mean 
                                                           
1 It should be stressed that as we do no take exchange-rate risk into account, our methodology tends to 
underestimate overall risk, hence the benefits of diversification. 
  11time the banking groups originating from countries such as Denmark, Spain or Italy could 
have almost halved their risks. On the other hand, banking groups from Germany, France or 
the United Kingdom could have (only) cut their risks by 40%. 
 
Table 3: Risk-return efficiency scores by country 
Country 
 
N Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Std  Deviation 
Austria  1  62.02  . . . 
Belgium  2  58.26 58.04 58.48  0.32 
Denmark  1  51.23  . . . 
Finland  1  42.33  . . . 
France  9  59.35 59.08 60.68  0.51 
Germany  14 60.45 57.19 82.28  6.59 
Italy  7  52.29 51.92 53.03  0.44 
Netherlands  4  60.33 57.66 64.78  3.41 
Spain  2  51.12 48.69 53.55  3.44 
Sweden  2  55.70 55.41 55.99  0.41 
United Kingdom  9  60.56 60.49 60.83  0.12 
Total  52 58.05 42.33 82.28  5.31 
All figures are in percentage. N: number of observations in each country. 
 
Owing to the weak diversification of banking groups, the main factor that explains 
those differences lies in the risk-return performance of their home countries. For instance, 
appendix A.2 reveals that Austria and Finland exhibit comparable average annual growth 
rates, but that growth was much more volatile in Finland over our period of study. 
Moreover, the intra-country dispersion of scores visibly differs between countries. 
This is due to the differences in the diversification policies of banking groups of the same 
country. Thus, these groups may exhibit various degrees of diversification or be diversified 
among different countries. 
Closer scrutiny of individual efficiency scores allows a more finely grained 
explanation of the differences in scores.
10 On the extremes, German Depfa could hardly 
reduce its risk exposure by 17.7% whereas Finnish MeritaNordBanken may more than halve 
it. Those results are readily explained once one remarks that the former is already somewhat 
diversified, whereas the latter keeps three quarters of its loans in Finland, which has an 
unsatisfactory risk-return performance as was already mentioned, and has concentrated the 
rest of its activities in a highly correlated economy (i.e. Sweden). 
Those results clearly stress that banking groups could have benefited from an efficient 
reduction in the risk of their environment if they had diversified their activities over our 
period of study. In other words, banking groups did not take advantage of the possibilities of 
  12risk diversification in Europe (and for some of them, no advantage at all). The answer to 
question Q3 is consequently clearly negative. 
 
4. Could have mergers improved banks’ risk-return efficiency? 
 
The results of section 3 show that large European banking groups do not have optimal 
loan portfolios in terms of geographic risk diversification. The analysis concluded to the sub-
optimality of loan portfolios and, as a result, to the existence of potential gains in risk 
diversification for European banking groups. 
However, it can be argued that optimal loan portfolios may imply a very dispersed 
presence of banking groups across Europe. These efficient portfolios may simply be 
unfeasible, due to the impossibility to merge a large number of banks together. Indeed, 
because of the costs involved by any merger deal, realistic mergers would only be operations 
between two banks. 
Our aim in this section is to simulate hypothetical mergers between pairs of large 
European banking groups to observe if these mergers improve the risk-return efficiency of 
these groups.
11 We then provide a realistic answer to the question of knowing whether 
European banking groups would have been able to improve their risk-return efficiency thanks 




The simulations of mergers are conducted on all 52 banking groups, by making pairs 
of groups. 1326 merged pairings were generated. The key assumption of the simulations is 
that the hypothetically merged banking group is simply the aggregation of the two individual 
banking groups. Thus, the loans of the new entity are the sum of the loans of both partners in 
the merger. 
We measure the risk-return efficiency of hypothetically merged banking groups 
following the same methodology as in section 3. We compute the return and the risk of each 
new entity, by calculating the relative shares of loans resulting from the merger. The risk-
return efficiency score is then once again obtained, by comparing the optimal risk to the 
effective risk of the entity for the same level of return, according to expression 4. We can then 
  13observe if any improvement in risk-return efficiency can be obtained for each partner in the 
merger. 
The large number of banking groups in the sample precluded individual examination 
of all possible mergers. Instead we summarize the outcome of the study by providing results 
by country. It provides information about the existence of gains for banking groups from one 
country to merge with groups from another country. Moreover, we also examine three pairs of 
banking groups that merged subsequent to the estimation period. We observe if those mergers 
would have improved each partner’s risk-return efficiency. 
 
4.2 Exhaustive bank pairings 
 
Table 4 shows results for the simulations of mergers. It gathers results by country to 
summarize the whole dataset of simulated mergers. Each case of the table includes two 
figures. The figure in bold (italic) letters indicates the mean variation (standard deviation) of 
efficiency scores for banking groups originating from the country mentioned at the beginning 
of the line when merging with banking groups originating from the country mentioned at the 
beginning of the column.
12
Let us for instance consider the case at the intersection between the GER line and the 
FR column. The figure in bold letters of the case is 2.01. This is the positive mean variation of 
scores for German banking groups when merging with French banking groups. For each 
German banking group, we computed the variation of its score when merging with each 
French banking group, and then we obtained the average variation of this German banking 
group when merging with French banking groups. The mean of the average variation of all 
German banking groups when merging with French banking groups was then computed. 
The striking feature of table 4 is the majority of positive mean variations in the table. 
This means that, in most cases, European banking groups would have improved their risk-
return efficiency scores if they had merged with foreign banking groups. The scarce negative 
mean variations were observed for groups merging with Spanish groups or with the Finnish 
one. Consequently, most banking groups would be able to improve their risk-return efficiency 
by proceeding to cross-border mergers. 
Two main factors explain the magnitude of the variations in efficiency that result from 
mergers. The first element is the correlation between the business cycles of the banking 
groups’ home countries, that was presented in table 1. Due to the weak diversification of 
banking groups, their loan portfolios are based mostly in their home country. Consequently, 
  14the correlation between the home countries of both partners of the merger has an impact on 
the variation of efficiency scores: the higher the correlation, the lower the gains of the merger, 
as the banking groups involved hold loan portfolios with related movements. This fact is a 
well-known result of the portfolio theory: to be hedged against risk, a well-diversified 
portfolio must include financial assets that are not correlated. 
The second element is the relative size of each partner in the merger. A banking group 
becomes more diversified when it merges with a foreign group of comparable size than when 
it merges with a partner that is an order of magnitude smaller or bigger than itself. A third 
factor also plays a role in the way mergers affect efficiency, though in a lesser way here: the 
diversification of each partner prior to the merger. However, we have shown above that only a 
few banking groups of our sample do hold diversified loan portfolios. Consequently, this 
factor does not play a major role in the interpretation of country means, but it does for a few 
specific mergers. 
Further examination of table 4 shows strong discrepancies in mean variations of scores 
between countries. On one side, the nationalities of the merging partners have a deep impact 
on the mean variation. This finding results from the differences in the inter-country 
correlation of business cycles and in the average size of banking groups between countries. 
For instance, merging with British banking groups is very profitable for all countries’ banking 
groups, mainly because of the low correlation of the British economy with the other EU 
members.  
Next to the influence of the inter-country correlation, the average size of a country’s 
banking groups plays a major role here. Thus, the Finnish banking group is a very bad partner, 
especially for Danish and Swedish groups. This result stems from the fact that the Finnish 
group is larger than the Danish and Swedish ones. As a consequence, merging with the 
Finnish group leads these groups to turn to a banking group largely dominated by Finnish 
loans. 
Furthermore, the intensity of potential gains varies a lot between countries. This is 
mainly the result of differences in inter-country correlations: the higher a country’s 
correlation with other EU countries, the lower the gains for its banking groups will be. Thus, 
French and German banking groups reap proportionally lower gains than groups from other 
countries, while the Finnish banking group benefits a lot from any merger with another 
country, having a benefit ranging from 8.74 to 13.23 points, excluding the Nordic countries. 
  15Table 4: Results of simulated mergers by country 
Country  AT BE DK FI  FR  GER IT  NL SE SP UK 
             
AT  .  2.68 1.52 -7.15 2.27 2.96 1.35 4.44 6.37 -2.04  12.00 
  . . . . . . . . . . . 
BE  6.44 0.29 1.09 -4.79 2.37 3.69 0.89 2.58 3.44 -1.66  12.06 
  0.64 0.32 0.38 2.01 0.35 0.52 0.35 1.12 0.12 0.66 0.23 
DK 12.30  8.12  .  -7.80  8.87  9.72 2.93 9.96 6.40 0.80  10.50 
  . . . . . . . . . . . 
FI  12.54 11.14  1.11  .  12.09 13.23 8.74 12.97 4.84  8.95 12.54 
  . . . . . . . . . . . 
FR  4.95 1.28 0.76 -4.93 0.12 3.11 -0.17 3.02 2.79 -2.99 8.95 
  0.72 0.56 0.26 2.20 0.15 0.37 0.56 0.28 0.40 0.86 0.55 
GER  4.53 1.50 0.50 -4.89 2.01 -0.95 1.15 1.89 3.88 -1.73 7.47 
  4.07 5.26 0.34 9.06 5.16 4.90 5.30 4.59 5.42 6.38 6.05 
IT  11.08 6.86 1.86 -1.22 6.88 9.31 0.02 8.96 6.16 1.26  13.71 
  1.35 0.70 0.70 1.90 0.72 0.77 0.26 0.74 0.71 0.42 0.86 
NL  6.14 0.52 0.87 -5.02 2.04 2.01 0.93 -0.68 2.59 -1.28 8.19 
  4.18 3.79 0.54 9.86 4.21 3.58 5.86 2.94 4.61 6.64 5.48 
SE  12.69 5.99 1.93 -8.53 6.43 8.63 2.75 7.22 -0.01  -1.12  12.01 
  0.14 0.30 0.06 0.40 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.41 0.42 0.25 
SP  8.86 5.48 0.91 0.16 5.24 7.60 2.43 7.93 3.47 0.66  10.56 
  1.06 1.44 0.01 1.74 1.57 1.21 2.84 1.21 0.51 3.44 0.35 
UK  13.46 9.76 1.17 -5.69 7.74 7.36 5.44 7.96 7.15 1.11 0.01 
  1.41 0.68 0.47 3.04 0.65 0.34 0.84 0.32 0.58 1.89 0.06 
AT Austria, BE Belgium, DK Denmark, FI Finland, FR France, GER Germany, GR Greece, IE Ireland, IT Italy, 
LU Luxembourg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, SE Sweden, SP Spain, UK United Kingdom. 
All figures are in percentage. 
 
Additionally, the mean variations that appear on the first diagonal, representing the 
results of domestic mergers, are very close to zero. This is a logical consequence of the weak 
diversification of banking groups, which causes domestic mergers to increase the size of their 
portfolios without modifying the relative shares of loans in European countries. Above and 
beyond, it is of the highest interest to observe that domestic mergers may even result in 
significant losses in risk diversification. For instance, domestic mergers in Germany or Spain 
lead to negative changes in mean efficiency scores for more than one observation. This is an 
important result, as instead of concluding to the neutrality of domestic mergers in terms of 
risk diversification, we can then observe that the motive of geographic risk diversification 
leads not to undertake domestic mergers. 
Finally, the low standard deviation in most cells of table 4 is also a result of the weak 
diversification of banking groups. As all groups from one country have very similar loan 
portfolios in terms of loan shares by country, the effects of mergers are similar for all banking 
groups from the same country. 
 
  164.3. A few specific bank pairings 
 
We now focus our analysis on three bank pairings that occurred after our period of 
study: the French domestic merger between BNP and Paribas, the Italian domestic merger 
between Banca di Roma and San Paolo IMI, the Austrian-German cross-border merger 
between Bank Austria and Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank. Our objective here is to check 
if these mergers may have improved the risk diversification of the loan portfolio of each 
partner of the merger. In this aim, we look at the variation of the risk-return efficiency scores 
of each partner in the merger. 
 
Table 5: Changes in risk diversification for recent bank mergers 





BNP-Paribas  BNP  59.31 59.33 +0.02 
  Paribas  59.36 59.33 -0.03 
Banca di Roma –   Banca di Roma  52.30  52.64  +0.34 
San Paolo IMI  San Paolo IMI  52.79  52.64  -0.15 
Bayerische Hypo  Bayerische Hypo  58.79  62.34  +3.55 
-Bank  Austria  Bank  Austria  62.02 62.34 +0.32 
All scores in percentage. 
 
Table 5 displays the results of these mergers. Changes in scores for both domestic 
mergers are very weak, because of the high similarity of the country composition of loan 
portfolios of both merging partners. Variations are negative for Paribas and San Paolo IMI but 
positive for BNP and Banca di Roma. It is noteworthy that in both mergers, the more 
diversified bank benefits from a gain in risk diversification. The cross-border merger provides 
a stronger variation at least for one bank: Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank faces a strong 
increase in its efficiency score from 58.79% to 62.34%, while Bank Austria only benefits 
from a small improvement (+0.32). Consequently, and as expected, this cross-border merger 
provides strong gains in risk diversification for at least one partner. 
This section analyzed the risk diversification effects of mergers between all pairings of 
European banking groups. Our results can be summarized in two main conclusions. 
Firstly, cross-border mergers provide better gains in risk diversification than domestic 
mergers: on one hand, table 4 shows that on average cross-border mergers generally increase 
risk-return efficiency scores, while domestic mergers do not have a significant impact on 
  17these scores. On the other hand, among the three recent mergers to which we gave a closer 
look, only the cross-border one provides large gains to one partner. Accordingly, the answer 
to question Q4 is undoubtedly positive. 
Secondly, domestic mergers may have markedly reduced risk diversification. Indeed 
we have observed that some domestic mergers would have resulted in negative changes in 
efficiency scores for more than one observation. Consequently, we provide evidence against 




Our aim in this paper was to analyze the motive of geographic diversification of risk in 
the loan activity for bank mergers in the European Union. Our conclusions clearly support the 
existence of potential gains in risk diversification from mergers involving partners with 
different nationalities. Indeed we have observed the existence of opportunities for geographic 
diversification in the European Union as business cycles are not perfectly correlated across 
EU members. Nonetheless, the largest European banking groups do not hold diversified loan 
portfolios, which means that their portfolios are not optimal in terms of risk diversification. 
We have then provided evidence about the existence of potential gains in risk diversification 
from cross-border mergers. In the mean time, we have also observed that domestic mergers 
may in fact worsen loan portfolios’ risk diversification. Consequently, the major normative 
conclusion of this paper is that the motive of geographic risk diversification is a valid 
argument in favor of cross-border mergers, which was still not exploited by large European 
banking groups in 1997. 
With so unambiguous evidence on the gains in risk diversification from cross-border 
bank mergers, we may wonder why these mergers did not happen, in other words why banks 
kept home-biased loan portfolios. A first reason is that bank managers do not fully take this 
argument into account. Thus, Rose (1989) observed on a sample of US mergers that when 
banks managers involved in mergers were asked upon their motives to merge, risk reduction 
was one of the least frequently mentioned answers. 
A second reason is the persistence of political barriers that prevented cross-border 
mergers. However, as suggested by Boot (1999, p.610), “the domestic banks in Europe were -
and are- protected as domestic flagships”. Next to preventing cross-border mergers, this 
  18argument also plays a role in justifying domestic mergers in the aim of creating big national 
champions, less threatened by a foreign takeover. 
However these barriers may disappear with the implementation of a totally integrated 
European banking market. With the last steps towards full integration, a wave of cross-border 
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Appendix A.1: Sample of banks 
 
 
Abbey National, ABN Amro, Almanij, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Banca di Roma, Banca 
Intesa, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Banco Santander Central 
Hispano, Bank Austria, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten (BNG), Bank 
of Scotland, BNP, Barclays, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, Bayerische Landesbank 
Girozentrale, BHW, Commerzbank, Crédit Agricole, Crédit Lyonnais, Crédit Mutuel, Credito 
Italiano, Depfa, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank, Dexia, Dresdner Bank, 
Foereningssparbanken, Fortis, Groupe Banques Populaires, Groupe Caisses d’Epargne, 
Halifax, HSBC, ING, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW), Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg, Landesbank Hessen, Lloyd TSB, MeritaNordBanken, Natwest, Nationwide 
Building Society, Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, Nykredit, Paribas, Rabobank, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, San Paolo IMI, Société Générale, Svenska Handelsbanken, 
Unicredito Italia, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
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Appendix A.2: Descriptive statistics for growth rates 
 
Country Mean  Standard  dev. Minimum  Maximum 
Austria 0.0329 0.0200 -0.0036  0.0713
Belgium 0.0302 0.0222 -0.0150  0.0694
Denmark 0.0280 0.0235 -0.0094  0.0927
Finland 0.0321 0.0324 -0.0707  0.0960
France 0.0323 0.0208 -0.0129  0.0699
Germany 0.0288 0.0208 -0.0125  0.0746
Greece 0.0420 0.0359 -0.0363  0.1116
Ireland 0.0457 0.0259 -0.0044  0.1115
Italy 0.0339 0.0243 -0.0215  0.0821
Luxembourg 0.0382 0.0343 -0.0656  0.1042
Netherlands 0.0322 0.0213 -0.0116  0.0827
Portugal 0.0421 0.0326 -0.0434  0.1120
Spain 0.0416 0.0310 -0.0113  0.1184
Sweden 0.0250 0.0215 -0.0222  0.0683





Appendix A.3: Volumes of loans of banking groups by country 
 
Country N  Mean  Std  Deviation 
Austria  1  78 617 381.03  . 
Belgium  2  97 138 129.94  28 160 136.96 
Denmark  1  5 490 482.42  . 
Finland  1  132 485 202.33  . 
France  9  123 299 270.43  50 444 477.80 
Germany  14  158 485 309.55  151 010 688.63 
Italy  7  76 330 061.25  31 229 473.82 
Netherlands  4  102 659 548.88  79 666 478.98 
Spain  2  99 866 702.54  10 270 860.25 
Sweden  2  64 134 304.81  3 081 393.96 
United Kingdom  9  115 429 264.53  51 222 437.70 
N: number of observations in each country. 
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1 We were concerned that convergence among European economies may bias our results. We consequently 
performed the same correlation analysis on two sub-periods (1960-1977 and 1978-1995). We observed no 
common trend in the evolution of the coefficients of correlation. 
2 For a more comprehensive study of the impact of European integration on risk diversification, the interested 
reader may refer to Goldberg and Levi (2000). 
3 An alternative would have been to consider all loans from each bank in which the group owns any 
participation, and then to weight this loan volume by the ownership percentage of the group to compute the 
whole loan portfolio. This approach was not followed however, mainly because of the difficulties involved by 
the aggregation of loans with such a scenario. In particular it would be impossible to manage indirect 
participations beyond the third level of control. 
4 The motivation for this choice is the fact that holding banks do not in general hold significant volumes of loans. 
5 Appendix A.1 lists the banking groups included in the sample. Appendix A.3 presents the descriptive statistics 
for the volumes of loans by country. 
6 As an example, on the ‘DE’ line, the German banking groups have a mean Herfindahl index of 85.68% with a 
standard deviation of 17.59%. 
7 Observe that if a bank with a home share of 93%, the mean home share of our sample, has all its loans abroad 
in the same country, it has a Herfindahl index for (93%)²+(7%)²=86.98%. As the mean Herfindahl index of our 
sample is 88.56%, we can then conclude that the dispersion of loans abroad is very weak. 
8 To determine an efficient portfolio, we must define the share of each country in that portfolio. We do so under 
the assumption that no risk-free asset is available, which is justified in our framework as no country can provide 
a constant growth rate, and by imposing the constraint that the volume of loans in any given country cannot be 
negative. For conciseness, we do not further develop the portfolio theory here. The interested reader may 
however refer to chapter 6 of Copeland and Weston (1988) for an exposition of the determination of efficient 
portfolios. 
9 Our sample contains no banking group whose home country is either Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg or Portugal. 
It must nevertheless be stressed that these countries were included as potential assets when optimal portfolios 
were formed. Furthermore some banking groups of our sample hold loans in these countries. 
10 Individual efficiency scores are available on request. 
11 Simulations of mergers were also performed by Shaffer (1993) on US data and Altunbas, Molyneux and 
Thornton (1997) on European data to study the predicted impact of mergers on bank costs. However these works 
have not investigated the risk diversification implied by mergers. 
12 Table 4 is not symmetric, as the variation of scores is computed in comparison with the banking groups whose 
nationality is at the beginning of the line. Consequently, the variations of scores differ for German and French 
banking groups when merging with one another, as their pre-merger scores are different. We of course do not 
include mergers of banking groups with themselves, and there is no mean variation of scores on the first diagonal 
for countries with only one banking group. Furthermore the standard deviation is not mentioned, whenever there 
is only one banking group in the analyzed country (as in Austria, Denmark, Finland). 
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